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1. Introduction
It is well known that efficient contracting may be hampered by adverse selection problems that
arise when outputs depend on privately known talents or types. Besides an impressive theoretical
literature that addresses the design of optimal contracts in the presence of adverse selection
(e.g., Bolton and Dewatripont, 2005), alternative solutions based on insights from behavioral
economics and laboratory experiments have recently been proposed (e.g., Fehr et al., 2007).
In particular, experimental studies have demonstrated that “cheap talk,” i.e. non-binding and
costless communication, can enhance efficiency (Charness and Dufwenberg, 2006, 2011) and can
be more effective than monetary incentives (Brandts and Cooper, 2007). Plausible explanations
that have been put forth are that cheap talk messages contain implicit promises that are costly
to break when agents get disutility from lying or from letting others down.
Much of this recent literature, however, focuses on bilateral relationships between a single
principal and a single agent. This is obviously different from many real-world settings, e.g. when
multiple job applicants compete for a single job (especially in times of a recession). It is con-
ceivable that competition will change the nature of the messages exchanged, or the propensity
with which promises are kept. In addition, implicit promises may have less impact when a prin-
cipal receives similar messages from more than one agent. It is, therefore, natural to ask whether
cheap-talk communication is still effective in promoting efficient contracting when competition
exists.
To address this question, we vary the possibility of communication in the one-shot principal-
agent game studied by Charness and Dufwenberg (2011) and in an extension where the principal
selects one of two agents before playing the game. This variation of the game defines our com-
petition treatments. Our experiment replicates the main finding of Charness and Dufwenberg
(2011). We find that in the “no-competition” treatments, communication raises efficiency. We
also find that in the “no-communication” treatments, competition raises efficiency. Thus, by
themselves, communication and competition positively affect efficiency. However, compared to
treatments with competition or communication only, efficiency is lower in a treatment with both
communication and competition. In other words, competition and communication act as substi-
tutes. Communication raises efficiency without competition but not with competition. Likewise,
competition raises efficiency without communication but lowers efficiency with communication.
We review related experimental work and several behavioral theories that have been proposed
in this context. We find that lie aversion, guilt aversion, inequality aversion, and reciprocity all
capture some but not all features of the data. We expressly do not propose an alternative theory
but rather hope that our findings will stimulate further theoretical work in this area.
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes our experimental
design based on the principal-agent game with hidden information. In Section 3 we report the
effects of communication and competition. We also correlate messages with outcomes to provide
additional insights into behavior. Section 4 briefly discusses related experiments and evaluates
several behavioral theories. Section 5 concludes and the Appendix contains the instructions.
2. Experimental Design
2.1. A Simple Principal-Agent Game
The experiment employs simple variations of the principal-agent game with hidden information as
proposed by Charness and Dufwenberg (2011). The principal needs to hire an agent to complete
a project, which can be either a simple project at a wage of 14, or a difficult project at a wage of
20. Agents can be either of “Low” type (with probability 2/3) or of “High” type (with probability
1/3). Both types of agents can complete the simple project while only the high-type agent can
successfully complete the difficult project. The contract cannot be conditioned on the agent’s
type, which is private information; the principal only knows the ex ante probabilities that an
agent is of low or high type.
The game tree is summarized in Figure 1.1 If the principal chooses not to hire (“Out”) then
both the principal and the agent get their outside-option payoffs of 10. When the principal
chooses to hire (“In”) the outcome depends on who accepts the difficult project. If a low-type
agent selects the difficult project (“Roll”) then he fails and the principal gets 0. If a high-type
agent selects the difficult project then in the with-die-roll (“WDR”) version of the game the
project is completed successfully with probability 5/6 and the principal receives 24, otherwise
the principal gets nothing. In the no-die-roll (“NDR”) version of the game the principal gets
(the expected value) 20 for sure. (These two versions are introduced to test different models of
guilt, as explained in Section 4 below.) Finally, if the simple project is selected (“Don’t Roll”)
by either type of agent then the principal receives 14.
Socially optimal contracts are possible when information is complete, i.e. when the contract
can be conditioned on the agent’s type. In this case, the principal hires a low-type agent to
complete the simple project or a high-type agent to complete the difficult project. It will be
useful to compare the outcomes observed in the experiment to this efficient benchmark.
Definition. The efficient outcomes are (“In”, “Don’t Roll”) when the agent is of low type and
(“In”, “Roll”) when the agent is of high type. All other outcomes are inefficient.
1 We doubled the payoffs in Charness and Dufwenberg (2011) to make the monetary incentives more salient.
Communication & Competition 3
High [1
3
]Low [2
3
]
Chance
Principal
InOut
10, 10
InOut
10, 10
Roll
0, 20
Don’t
14, 14
Agent
Roll
πP , 20
Don’t
14, 14
Agent
Figure 1. A principal-agent game with hidden information. In the no-die-roll (“NDR”) version piP = 20 for sure
while in the with-die-roll (“WDR”) version piP = 24 with probability 5/6 and piP = 0 with probability 1/6.
When contracts are efficient, the ex ante expected payoffs are readily computed to be 16 for the
principal and 16 for the agent. These payoffs are higher than those that result when contracts
cannot be conditioned on the agent’s private information. With selfish and risk neutral agents,
the prediction is that both low-type and high-type agents will choose “Roll,” and, hence, the best
response for the principal is to choose “Out,” resulting in payoffs of 10 for both the principal and
the agent.2 The setting of Figure 1 therefore captures the adverse selection problem that hinders
efficient contracting.
2.2. Design and Procedures
Treatment Competition Communication Channel Group Size # of Groups # of Subjects
2NC-WDR No none 2 24 48
2C-WDR No %ĺ$ 2 24 48
2NC-NDR No none 2 25 50
2C-NDR No %ĺ$ 2 23 46
3NC-WDR Yes none 3 39 117
3C-WDR Yes %ĺ$%ĺ$ 3 37 111
Table 1. The experimental design varies whether there is competition between agents and whether one-sided
communication from the agent(s) to the principal is possible. In addition, in the no-competition treatments the
principal’s payoff is 20 for sure in the no-die-roll treatments and it is 24 with chance 5/6 and zero otherwise in
the with-die-roll treatments.
Table 1 summarizes the different treatments of the experiment, which vary by whether or not
there is agent competition (group size two or three), whether or not communication is allowed
(“C” or “NC”), and whether or not the principal’s payoff when a high-type agent chooses “Roll”
2 Choosing “In” yields an expected payoff of only 1/3× 5/6× 24 = 20/3 for the principal.
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is uncertain (“NDR” or “WDR”). Communication is one-way, e.g. in “2C-NDR” or “2C-WDR”
the agent can send free-form messages to the principal but not vice versa. In the no-competition
treatments with group size equal to two the principal is paired with a single agent while in the
competition treatments with a group size of three there is an additional agent. In the competition
treatments the principal has to select one of the two agents prior to playing the game shown in
Figure 1. In “3C-WDR” both agents can send free-form messages to the principal to influence
the principal’s selection while this is not possible in treatment “3NC-WDR”.3 Communication is
again one-way and is delivered via two independent chat windows so that agents cannot observe
or influence each other’s messages. To create a salient economic incentive to compete, the outside
option payoff for the agent who is not selected is 5, while for the agent who is selected but not
hired it is 10. Note that post-selection the game being played is exactly the same for the principal
and selected agent as in the no-competition case.
We recruited a total of 420 subjects from the University of Zu¨rich and the neighboring ETH.
The sessions without communication typically took about half an hour and the sessions with
communication took about an hour, including the instruction and payment phases. The reason
that the experiments were quick is that there was only a single period of play. Average earnings
were 23 CHF including a 10 CHF show-up fee at an exchange rate of roughly 1 CHF for $1. The
experimental instructions closely follow those of Charness and Dufwenberg (2011), see Appendix
A.4
3. Results
We first discuss the aggregate outcomes in the different treatments and then provide an analysis
of the messages that were sent in the communication treatments.
3.1. Outcomes
We start by comparing the outcomes of our no-competition treatments (with group size two) to
those of Charness and Dufwenberg (2011) to check whether we replicate their findings. The left
and middle panels of Figure 2 show the fraction of “In” choices made by the principal and the
fraction of “Don’t Roll” choices made by the low-type agent respectively. We do not separately
3 Stigler (1987, p. 531) defines competition as “a rivalry between individuals ... that arises whenever two or more
parties strive for something that all cannot obtain.” Treatment “3C-WDR” captures this definition while keeping
the incentives for the principal and the selected agent the same as in the “2C-WDR” treatment. This allows
us to isolate the effect of competition when communication is possible. Furthermore, the comparison between
treatments “3C-WDR” and “3NC-WDR” allows us to measure the effect of communication in the presence of
competition.
4 One difference is that our experiments were computerized using zTree (Fischbacher, 2007). In all treatments
with communication, subjects could choose to remain silent by simply clicking the continue button.
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Figure 2. The left panel displays the “In” rates, the middle panel the “Don’t Roll” rates, and the right panel the
predicted fraction of efficient outcomes for the no-competition treatments. In each panel, the “NC” bar refers to
the no-communication treatment and the “C” bar to the communication treatment. The data from the Charness
and Dufwenberg (2011) study are labeled “C&D” and the data of the with-die-roll and no-die-roll treatments are
labeled “WDR” and “NDR” respectively. The “Pooled” data represent the combined data of the with-die-roll and
no-die-roll treatments.
show the percentage of “Roll” choices for the high-type agents, which, like in the Charness and
Dufwenberg (2011) study, was 100% in all treatments. Each panel shows the results for the with-
die-roll (“WDR”) and no-die-roll (“NDR”) treatments separately and combined (“Pooled”) as
well as the results from the Charness and Dufwenberg (2011) study (labeled “C&D”). For each
data set, the left bar (“NC”) pertains to the no-communication treatment and the right bar (“C”)
to the communication treatment. The right panel in Figure 2 shows the predicted fraction of
efficient outcomes based on the choice data and, in the communication treatments, the messages
sent. We use the predicted rather than the observed fraction of efficient outcomes to correct for
any differences in outcomes unrelated to the subjects’ decisions.5
As can be seen from Figure 2, the “In” rates, “Don’t Roll” rates, and predicted percentages
of efficient outcomes are very similar for the “NDR” and “WDR” treatments, whether or not
communication is allowed. Furthermore, they are all similar to the corresponding rates for the
Charness and Dufwenberg (2011) study. Indeed, formal statistical tests reveal no significant dif-
ferences (at the 10%-level) for either the “In” rate, “Don’t Roll” rate, or the predicted percentage
of efficient outcomes with or without communication.6
5 For instance, agents’ types were randomly determined by the program and the fraction of high-type agents
varied from 28.6% to 41.7% across treatments. To correct for this variability, the predicted fraction of efficient
outcomes, pIn( 1
3
+ 2
3
pDR), uses the ex ante probabilities for each type. Here pIn denotes the principal’s “In” rate
and pDR the low-agent’s “Don’t Roll” rate. In the communication treatments, the “In” and “Don’t Roll” rates
may depend on the agent’s message, m, which, in turn, may depend on the agent’s type. The predicted fraction
of efficient outcomes now becomes
∑
m p
In(m)( 1
3
PH(m) +
2
3
PL(m)p
DR(m)) where PL(m) and PH(m) are the
probabilities that a low-type or high-type agent sends message m respectively. See Section 3.2 for a detailed
discussion on how messages were classified and how the fraction of efficient outcomes were calculated for the case
with agent competition.
6 More specifically, a two-sided proportion test shows no significant difference at the 10% level between the
“In” rates in “NDR” vs “WDR”, “NDR” vs “C&D”, “WDR” vs “C&D”, and “pooled” vs “C&D”, for both the
“NC” and “C” treatments respectively. The same no-difference result holds for the “Don’t Roll” rate and the
percentage of efficient outcomes in both the “NC” and “C” treatments respectively. All p-values reported in this
paper are two-sided, unless otherwise stated.
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Figure 3. The left panel displays the “In” rates, the middle panel the “Don’t Roll” rates, and the right panel
the predicted fraction of efficient outcomes for all treatments.
Finding 1. Our no-competition treatments replicate Charness and Dufwenberg (2011)’s finding
that communication enhances efficiency.
Finding 2. The results from the no-die-roll and with-die-roll treatments are not significantly
different with or without communication.
Since there are no significant differences between the “NDR” and “WDR” treatments we will
consider only the pooled data in the remainder of this section. To avoid confusion, we drop the
“NDR” and “WDR” labels and refer to the pooled data from the two-person communication
treatments as “2C” and to those from the no-communication treatments as “2NC.” Figure 3
shows the “In” rates, “Don’t Roll” rates, and percentage of efficient outcomes for these pooled
data sets and the corresponding rates for the competition treatments, which are now labeled
“3NC” and “3C.”
Note that the three panels of Figure 3 show a similar pattern: the “In” rate, the “Don’t Roll”
rate, and the percentage of efficient outcomes are high for the “2C” and “3NC” treatments and
low for the “2NC” and “3C” treatments. Formal statistical tests reported in Table 2 confirm that
competition raises efficiency without communication (3NC vs. 2NC) but it lowers efficiency with
communication (3C vs 2C).7 Likewise, communication raises efficiency in the absence of compe-
tition (2C vs 2NC) but not with competition (3C vs 3NC).8 In other words, communication and
competition act as “substitutes.”
Finding 3. Competition raises efficiency without communication but lowers efficiency with com-
munication.
7 Efficiency rises from 30.1% in 2NC to 53.5% in 3NC (p=0.026) but it falls from 64.4% in 2C to 37.5% in 3C
(p=0.014).
8 Efficiency rises from 30.1% in 2NC to 64.4% in 2C (p < 0.001) but it falls from 53.5% in 3NC to 37.5% in 3C
(p=0.162). Had we based our null hypotheses on Charness and Dufwenberg’s (2011) finding that communication
raises efficiency then this null hypothesis would be rejected in a one-sided test (p=0.081). Note that Charness and
Dufwenberg (2011) use a one-sided test to evaluate the effect of communication on efficiency.
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Finding 4. Communication raises efficiency without competition but not with competition.
This substitute relationship may result from the fact that competition affects the messages sent
or the extent to which the principal relies on the messages, or possibly both. To explore this
issue, we next provide a detailed analysis of the messages exchanged in the different treatments.
Treatment C NC Z Stat C NC Z Stat C NC Z Stat
N=2 41/47 26/49 3.65*** 17/28 7/20 1.76* 64.4% 30.1% 3.37***
(87%) (53%) (61%) (35%)
N=3 22/37 29/39 -1.38 6/12 11/19 -0.43 37.5% 53.5% -1.40
(59%) (74%) (50%) (58%)
Effect of Competition
Z Stat
A's In  Rate B's Don’t  Roll  Rate % Efficient Outcome
-2.92*** 2.05** -0.63 1.43 -2.45** 2.22**
Table 2. Results from a two-sided proportion test to evaluate the effects of communication and competition. The
“Z stat” reflects the test of equal proportions across treatments with p-values at 10%, 5%, and 1% indicated by
*, **, and ***, respectively.
3.2. Messages
We employed two independent coders to classify the free-form messages using the scheme devel-
oped by Charness and Dufwenberg (2011). In particular, there are three basic message types:
“NP” for no promise, “LD” when a low-type agent discloses her type and promises to choose
“Don’t Roll,” and “HR” when a high-type agent discloses her type and promises to choose
“Roll.”9
Table 3 provides an overview of the messages sent by each agent type in our no-competition
treatments and compares them with those from the Charness and Dufwenberg (2011) study. In
each box in Table 3, the row labeled “Total” shows the total number of times each message was
used, while the percentage below the box expresses this as a frequency. Using the Fisher’s exact
test to compare the distributions of messages types (NP, LD, and HR) reveals no significant dif-
ferences (at the 10% level) between the “NDR” and “WDR” messages nor are there significant
differences between the pooled messages and the messages from the Charness and Dufwenberg
(2011) study.
Finding 5. The frequencies with which the different message types occurred in our communica-
tion treatment without competition are not significantly different from those observed by Charness
9 As in Charness and Dufwenberg (2011) most, but not all, messages can be captured with this coding scheme.
Other types of messages are “PL” when a low-type agent only discloses her type with no promise about the action
she will take, “PR” when the agent only promises to “Roll” without disclosing her type, “PH” when the agent
claims to be of high type with no promise about the action, and “DR” when the agent promises to choose “Don’t
Roll” without disclosing her type. The first two messages were classified as “NP,” the third message as “HR” and
the fourth message as “LD.” Finally, empty talk messages and no messages are included in “NP.”
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NP LD HR Total NP LD HR Total
Out 4 1 0 5 Out 2 2 1 5
In, R 0 0 5 5 In, R 4 2 5 11
In, DR 4 13 1 18 In, DR 3 13 1 17
Total 8 14 6 28 Total 9 17 7 33
28.6% 50.0% 21.4% 100.0% 27.3% 51.5% 21.2% 100.0%
Out 2 0 1 3 Out 0 0 1 1
In, R 0 2 8 10 In, R 1 0 12 13
In, DR 0 0 0 0 In, DR 0 0 0 0
Total 2 2 9 13 Total 1 0 13 14
15.4% 15.4% 69.2% 100.0% 7.1% 0.0% 92.9% 100.0%
NP LD HR Total NP LD HR Total
Out 1 0 1 2 Out 1 2 0 3
In, R 1 2 2 5 In, R 3 0 3 6
In, DR 2 5 1 8 In, DR 1 8 0 9
Total 4 7 4 15 Total 5 10 3 18
26.7% 46.7% 26.7% 100.0% 27.8% 55.6% 16.7% 100.0%
Out 0 0 0 0 Out 0 0 1 1
In, R 1 0 8 9 In, R 0 0 4 4
In, DR 0 0 0 0 In, DR 0 0 0 0
Total 1 0 8 9 Total 0 0 5 5
11.1% 0.0% 88.9% 100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 100.0%
C & D (2010)
Low
High
2C-WDR
Low
High
High
2C (pooled)
Low
High
2C-NDR
Low
Table 3. Messages and outcomes in the communication treatments without competition. The data from the
Charness and Dufwenberg (2011) study are labeled “C&D” and the data from the with-die-roll and no-die-roll
treatments are labeled “WDR” and “NDR” respectively. The “Pooled” data represent the combined data of the
with-die-roll and no-die-roll treatments.
and Dufwenberg (2011).
Finding 6. The frequencies with which the different message types occurred in the no-die-roll
and with-die-roll communication treatments without competition are not significantly different.
Table 3 also lists the resulting outcomes by message and agent type. A test of our coding scheme is
whether the messages capture everything that the principal knows about the agent, i.e. whether,
conditional on the message, the principal’s choice is independent of the agent’s type.10 Using a
simple proportion test reveals that, conditional on the message received, there are no significant
differences (at the 10% level) between the principal’s “In” rate when the message is sent by a
low or a high-type agent. This is true for the “2C-NDR” and “2C-WDR” messages as well as for
the pooled messages and the messages from the Charness and Dufwenberg (2011) study.
We next compare the messages from the pooled no-competition treatments (labeled “2C”)
with those from the competition treatment (“3C”), see the top panels of Table 4. First, with
or without competition, messages sent by low-type agents differ significantly from those sent
10 For example, in 2C (pooled) sample, the principal chose “In” in 6/7 cases when the low-type agent sent an
“HR” message and in 12/13 cases when the high-type agent sent an “HR” message.
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2C NP LD HR Total 3C NP LD HR Total
Low 9 17 7 33 Low 24 16 13 53
High 1 0 13 14 High 8 1 12 21
Total 10 17 20 47 Total 32 17 25 74
In 8/10 15/17 18/20 41/47 In 3/9 5/10 14/18 22/37
DR 3/7 13/15 1/6 17/28 DR 0/1 5/5 1/6 6/12
Matched Low 18.2% 34.3% 14.1% 66.6% Select Low 20.1% 22.3% 21.9% 64.3%
Matched High 2.4% 0.0% 31.0% 33.4% Select High 8.4% 1.8% 25.5% 35.7%
Total 20.6% 34.3% 45.1% 100.0% Total 28.5% 24.1% 47.4% 100.0%
Efficiency Low 6.2% 26.2% 2.1% 34.6% Efficiency Low 0.0% 11.2% 2.8% 14.0%
Efficiency High 1.9% 0.0% 27.9% 29.8% Efficiency High 2.8% 0.9% 19.8% 23.5%
Total 8.2% 26.2% 30.0% 64.4% Total 2.8% 12.0% 22.7% 37.5%
Table 4. A comparison of the communication treatments with and without competition. The top panels show
the messages sent by each type of agent as well as the low-type agent’s and principal’s choice frequencies. The top
parts of the lower panels show the frequencies with which low-type and high-type agents were matched (in 2C)
or selected (in 3C) given the message they sent. The bottom parts of the lower panels show how much low-type
and high-type agents contributed to the total percentage of efficient outcomes given the messages they sent.
by high-type agents.11 Moreover, messages differ significantly between the no-competition and
competition treatments.12 In particular, for both types of agents there is a shift from the message
they predominantly use in the absence of competition (“LD” for a low-type agent and “HR” for
a high-type agent) to the “NP” message.13 The rows labeled “Total” in the top panels of Table
4 show that while the “NP” message is least used (10/47) without competition it is the most
frequently used message (32/74) with competition.14
Finding 7. When competition is introduced there are fewer messages that contain claims about
agents’ types.
One explanation is that with competition, low-type agents do not disclose their true types for
fear of not being selected and do not claim to be of high type because they are lie averse. The
fact that some high-type agents also send “NP” messages might be because they anticipate that
“HR” messages are interpreted as lies by low-type agents.
11 The Fisher exact test comparing the NP, LD and HR messages sent by low-type and high-type agents yields
p < 0.001 for treatment “2C” and p = 0.010 for treatment “3C.”
12 For low-type agents the difference is close to being significant with p = 0.124, for high-type agents p = 0.073,
and for the pooled messages p = 0.041 using the Fisher exact test.
13 The proportion of “NP” messages sent by the low-type and high-type agents increases from 27% to 45% and
from 7% to 38% respectively. A two-sided proportion test shows that these increases are significant (p = 0.09 for
low-type agents and p = 0.04 for high-type agents).
14 In treatment 3C, out of 74 messages there were 32 NP messages that can be broken down as follow: 11 silent, 2
PR messages, 3 PL messages, and 16 empty talk messages. In 2C, out of 47 messages there were 10 NP messages:
1 silent, 3 PL messages, and 6 empty talk messages. A Fisher exact test cannot reject the null hypothesis that the
distributions of message types within the NP category are the same between 2C and 3C (p = 0.187). However,
there are significantly more NP messages in 3C (p = 0.013).
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The preponderance of “NP” messages make it harder for the principal to select high-type
agents and may negatively affect her decision to choose “In.” We first discuss the selection
issue. In treatment “2C,” given the frequency PL(m) with which a low-type agent sends message
m, the chance that the principal is matched with a low-type agent who sent message m is
PmatchedL (m) =
2
3PL(m). Similarly, the chance that the principal is matched with a high-type
agent who sent message m is PmatchedH (m) =
1
3PH(m). These match probabilities are shown in
the top part of the lower-left panel. Together with the “In” and “Don’t Roll” rates they determine
the predicted fraction of efficient outcomes by agent and message type15 and the overall fraction
of efficient outcomes:
∑
m∈{NP,LD,HR}
pIn(m)
(
PmatchedH (m) + P
matched
L (m)p
DR(m)
)
(1)
which yields 64.4% for treatment “2C,” see the bottom-left panel of Table 4.
In treatment “3C,” the principal can use the messages received to improve the chances of
selecting a high-type agent. To analyze this issue we simply record which message was selected
by the principal from each of the 37 pairs of messages received. If we order the messages (“NP”,
“LD”, “HR”) then the empirical selection frequencies can be conveniently summarized by the
following 3× 3 matrix
P select =

0.50 0.20 0.21
0.80 0.50 0.29
0.79 0.71 0.50

where each entry represents the probability the row message is selected.16 Note that “better”
messages are more likely chosen: “LD” and “HR” are more frequently selected when matched
with “NP,” and from the pair (“LD”,“HR”) the “HR” message is more frequently selected.
Given the above selection probability matrix we can compute the predicted frequency with
which the principal selects a low or high-type agent, for each of the three message types. The
chance that an agent is low-type, sends message m, and is selected is given by
P selectL (m) =
∑
m′ ∈{NP,LD,HR}
2
3PL(m)
(
2
3PL(m
′) + 13PH(m
′)
)
2P select(m,m′)
where the 2 appears because there are two agents that could have sent the selected message.
Analogously, for an agent who is of high type, the probability of being selected after sending
15 When a low-type agent sends message m, predicted efficiency is PmatchedL (m)p
In(m)pDR(m) and when a
high-type agent sends message m it is PmatchedH (m)p
In(m).
16 For example, the second entry in the top row indicates that 20% of the time the principal selects the “NP”
message from the pair (“NP”,“LD”). The first entry in the second row shows the “LD” message is selected from
such a pair with complementary probability. More generally, the sum of the selection matrix and its transpose
yields 1 in all entries since one of the two messages is selected. For the same reason the diagonal elements are 1/2.
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message m is
P selectH (m) =
∑
m′ ∈{NP,LD,HR}
1
3PH(m)
(
2
3PL(m
′) + 13PH(m
′)
)
2P select(m,m′)
These selection frequencies are shown in the bottom-right panel of Table 4. With competition
the overall frequency with which a high-type agent is selected goes up from 33.4% to 35.7%,
which is not significant.
Finding 8. The possibility of communication does not improve the principal’s ability to select
the high-type agent in the competition treatment.
For instance, when the principal faced one high-type and one low-type agent, the probability
that the high-type agent was selected is only 55% given the empirical distribution of the three
message types sent by the two types of agents (Table 4) and the selection probability matrix.
Thus communication does not help the principal to identify the high-type agent. The many “NP”
messages also affect the principal’s decision to choose “In.” Comparing the numbers in the top
panels of Table 4 shows that the “In” rate drops from 80% to 33% for the “NP” message, from
88% to 50% for the “LD” message, and from 90% to 78% for the “HR” message.17 The overall
“In” rate significantly drops from 87.2% in “2C” to 59.5% in “3C” (see Table 2).
Finding 9. In the communication treatments, the principal chooses “In” significantly less often
when competition is introduced.
Interestingly, low-type agents that sent “LD” messages are trustworthy and never “Roll” in
treatment 3C. The “Don’t Roll” rate conditional on sending a “LD” message is not different
from the one in treatment 2C.18 Aggregating over the different types of messages also shows
that the “Don’t Roll” rate is not different with and without competition (see Table 2). Finally,
the frequency with which selected low-type agents lie (either about their actions or types) is
not significantly higher in the treatment with competition.19 This is consistent with Rode’s
(2010) finding that lying reflects a stable social preference, which is insensitive to the competitive
context.
Finding 10. Low-type agents do not lie more nor are they less trustworthy when competition is
introduced.
17 For the “NP” and “LD” messages these differences are significant (p = 0.04 and p = 0.03 respectively).
18 The conditional “Don’t Roll” rates are 100% (5/5) and 87% (13/15) in treatments with and without compe-
tition respectively. The difference is not significant (p = 0.389).
19 The percentages of lies are 37.5% (9/24) and 27.3% (9/33) in treatments with and without competition
respectively. The difference is not significant (p = 0.412).
12 Jacob K. Goeree and Jingjing Zhang
The selection probabilities together with the observed “In” and “Don’t Roll” rates determine
the predicted fraction of efficient outcomes, similar to (1). These are shown in the bottom-right
panel of Table 4. In particular, the overall predicted fraction of efficient outcomes in treatment
“3C” is 37.5%.20 This is significantly lower than the corresponding percentages for treatments
“3NC” and “2C” (Findings 3 and 4).
To summarize, when competition is introduced, there are fewer messages that reveal ability
(Finding 7). This precludes the principal from selecting a high-type agent more frequently than
the ex ante probability of 1/3 (Finding 8). In addition, the many “NP” messages cause the
principal to be more cautious and she chooses “In” less frequently (Finding 9). Competition thus
negatively affects efficiency when communication is present. Finally, the principal would have
been better off by choosing “In” more often since the low-type agents are no less trustworthy
than in the no-competition treatments (Finding 10).
4. Related Experiments and Behavioral Explanations
The main goal of this paper is to report a replication and extension of Charness and Dufwenberg’s
(2011) experiment. Of course, there exist a number of other experiments that explore whether
cheap talk communication enhances trust.21 This prior work has demonstrated that individuals
trade off the intrinsic cost of lying against the economic cost of truthfulness. To capture this
trade off several theories have been proposed, including lie-aversion and various forms of guilt
aversion.22 Likewise, there exist a number of experiments studying the effects of competition on
trust.23 While the results of these experiments are mixed (i.e. competition can have a positive,
negative, or no effect), they have inspired several models of other-regarding behavior such as
20 An interesting extension is to let the principal’s “In” rate depend on both messages received. In this case, the
predicted fraction of efficient outcomes drops to 34.2% and the difference between “2C” and “3C” is significant at
the 5% level (p = 0.0475) and the difference between “3C” and “3NC” is significant at the 10% level (p = 0.09).
21 See, for instance, Gneezy (2005), Miettinen (2008), Vanberg (2008), Ellingsen et al. (2009), and Sutter (2009).
Charness and Dufwenberg (2010) and Serra-Garcia et al. (2011) study how the results depend on the type of
language used by comparing bare versus rich messages and vague versus precise messages respectively.
22 For models of lie aversion see Ellingsen and Johannesson (2004), Demichelis and Weibull (2008), Vanberg
(2008), and Kartik (2009). To model guilt, two notions are offered by Battigalli and Dufwenberg (2007, 2009):
simple guilt and guilt-from-blame. Charness and Dufwenberg (2006) and Ellingsen et al. (2010) provide evidence
of simple guilt in trust games while Charness and Dufwenberg (2011) test guilt-from-blame.
23 In repeated trust games that allow for reputation building, Huck et al. (2012) find that competition among
trustees significantly improves trust and trustworthiness and, hence, efficiency. In contrast, Fehr et al. (1998) and
Brandts and Charness (2004) find that competition does not significantly alter behavior in repeated gift-exchange
games. In a one-shot trust game where reputation formation is not possible, Bauernschuster et al. (2012) find that
when trustees can select from multiple trustors, the trustor with the highest offered amount is always chosen but
is returned a significantly lower amount than trustors receive in a control treatment without competition. Roth
et al. (1991) and Grosskopf (2003) investigate how competition affects bargaining outcomes.
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inequality-aversion and reciprocity.24 Our experiments, which allow for both competition and
communication, form an ideal test for these recently proposed theories.25
4.1. Guilt Aversion
With selfish agents the subgame-perfect equilibrium predicts only inefficient outcomes. The prin-
cipal chooses “Out” because there is a high chance (2/3) that choosing “In” will result in a zero
payoff since selfish agents choose to “Roll” independent of their type. The flip side of this argu-
ment is that for the principal to choose “In,” low-type agents would have to choose “Don’t Roll”
sufficiently often. Charness and Dufwenberg (2011) suggest that one reason why low-type agents
might choose “Don’t Roll” is to avoid feelings of guilt associated with letting the principal down.
There are two ways to model guilt. One version, called “simple guilt,” assumes that a low-type
agent’s guilt is proportional to the payoff loss she knows she caused. A different version, called
“guilt-from-blame,” assumes that a low-type agent’s guilt is proportional to the payoff loss she
believes she can be blamed for by the principal. To illustrate the differences between these two
guilt theories, consider the “NDR” and “WDR” versions of no-competition treatments. According
to the simple guilt theory, the amount of guilt incurred by a low-type agent who chooses “Roll”
is the same in both versions of the game. In contrast, guilt-from-blame predicts that feelings of
guilt are less pronounced in the “WDR” version of the game, since a low-type agent cannot be
fully blamed for a zero payoff for the principal. Guilt-from-blame thus predicts higher “Don’t
Roll” rates and, in equilibrium, higher “In” rates in the “NDR” version of the game. Since we
find no differences in behavior between “NDR” and “WDR” (see Finding 2), our data are best
explained by the simple-guilt theory.
Neither guilt theory, however, can explain the positive effect of competition on efficiency (see
Finding 4) since for the selected agent in treatment “3NC” the amount of guilt is the same as
in treatment “2NC.” In addition, as noted by Charness and Dufwenberg (2011), the reason for
the increased efficiency when communication is introduced in the no-competition treatment is
“outside the scope” of the simple guilt and guilt-from-blame models.
4.2. Lie Aversion
Lie aversion (Ellingsen and Johannesson, 2004) relies more directly on the possibility of commu-
nication. The basic idea underlying the theory is that an agent who makes a promise incurs a
24 See Fehr and Schmidt (1999), Bolton and Ockenfels (2000), Rabin (1993), Dufwenberg and Kirschsteiger
(2004), and Falk and Fischbacher (2006).
25 Rode (2010) is the only paper we are aware of that studies the interaction between communication and
competition. In Rode’s experiment, pairs of subjects either play a cooperative coordination game or a competitive
matching pennies game before being matched with a different opponent in a cheap-talk sender-receiver game. Rode
finds that the competitive nature of the initial game does not increase the number of lies but it does decrease
trust as it leads subjects to believe that the cheap-talk game is a situation of conflicting interest.
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cost k ≥ 0 when breaking it. In other words, lie aversion transforms cheap talk into costly talk
once promises are made. As a result, lie aversion allows for the possibility of a fully efficient equi-
librium where low-type agents promise “LD,” high-type agents promise “HR,” and the principal
chooses “In” when faced with an “LD” or “HR” message and “Out” when faced with an “NP”
message.26 Lie aversion can thus explain the increase in efficiency when communication is intro-
duced in the no-competition treatment (“2C” versus “2NC”). However, it cannot explain why
efficiency is not higher when communication is introduced in the competition treatment (“3C”
versus “3NC”), see Finding 3. Also, it cannot explain the increase in efficiency when competition
is introduced in the absence of communication (“2NC” versus “3NC”).
4.3. Inequality Aversion
When low-type agents are inequality averse they value the “Roll” option less because of the
disutility they get from being ahead in terms of payoffs. For example, according to the Fehr and
Schmidt (1999) model a low-type agent’s utility from choosing “Roll” would be 20− 20β where
β ≥ 0 is the inequality-aversion parameter that multiplies the difference between the agent’s
and the principal’s payoff. The low-type agent’s utility from choosing “Don’t Roll” is simply 14.
When β ≥ 0.3, agents would thus have an incentive to choose “Don’t Roll” and the principal
should choose “In.”
Now consider what happens if there is competition between agents. The selected agent now
compares her payoff to that of the principal and to that of the agent who was not selected. A
low-type agent’s utility from choosing “Roll” is now 20− 12β(20+15) > 20−20β while the utility
from choosing “Don’t Roll” is 14− 12β(9) < 14. In other words, the introduction of competition
makes the “Roll” option more attractive and the “Don’t Roll” option less attractive, resulting
in less efficient outcomes. Inequality aversion therefore predicts a reduction of efficiency due to
competition, which is the opposite of the first part of our Finding 4. Moreover, this outcome-
based theory cannot explain the effects of communication in the no-competition (“2C” versus
“2NC”) and competition treatment (“3C” versus “3NC”).
4.4. Reciprocity
Rabin’s (1993) reciprocity model is centered around the idea that kind actions trigger kind
responses while unkind actions are retaliated. For example, for the extensive-form game in Figure
1, the principal is kind when she chooses “In” with higher probability and the low-type agent
is kind when she chooses “Don’t Roll” with higher probability. For the high-type agent, “Roll”
is the unique Pareto efficient action since it makes both the principal and the agent better off,
and the high-type agent’s choice is therefore neither kind nor unkind. The notion that kindness
26 For the payoffs of Figure 1, it is trivial to verify that this is an equilibrium when the cost of lying k ≥ 6.
Communication & Competition 15
is reciprocated is captured by multiplying the kindness levels of the principal and the agent and
adding the result to players’ material payoffs, weighted by a reciprocity parameter ξ ≥ 0.
The reciprocity model allows for multiple equilibria. For example, the fully inefficient outcome
in which the principal chooses “Out” and both types of agents choose “Roll” is an equilibrium
for all levels of ξ. The reason is that the principal’s “Out” choice is unkind so a low-type agent
will prefer to “Roll” since this yields higher material payoff and the satisfaction of retaliation.
Similarly, the low-type agent’s “Roll” choice is unkind and the principal is better off choosing
“Out.” For high enough reciprocity levels also the fully efficient outcome in which the principal
chooses “In,” the low-type agent chooses “Don’t Roll,” and the high-type agent chooses “Roll”
is an equilibrium. Now, the principal’s choice is kind and the low-type agent prefers to forgo
material payoff and respond kindly.
The reciprocity model can thus explain a non-zero fraction of efficient outcomes in the “2NC”
treatment. Furthermore, it is the only model that predicts an increase in efficiency when compe-
tition is introduced in the no-communication treatments. Since the payoff of not being selected
is lower than the payoff of “Out,” a low-type agent will want to reciprocate even more when
the principal selects her and chooses “In.” This results in higher “Don’t Roll” rates and, hence,
higher “In” rates. As pointed out by Charness and Dufwenberg (2006), however, the reciprocity
model may have a hard time explaining the positive effects of communication. Suppose, for ex-
ample, that in treatment “2C,” a low-type agent promises not to “Roll.” If the principal believes
the promise then her “In” choice is not considered as kind as when this choice is made in the
treatment without communication.27
5. Conclusions
There are two important conclusions to take away from our experimental results. The first one
concerns the fragility of cheap-talk communication. We replicate recent findings by Charness
and Dufwenberg (2011) that communication is efficiency improving when a single agent sends
messages to a principal. However, this positive effect of communication is absent in our treat-
ment with agent competition.28 The second conclusion concerns the theoretical models, some
of which originated to explain the positive effects of communication in bilateral settings. We
review several leading alternatives, including lie aversion, guilt aversion, inequality aversion, and
reciprocity, and find that each of them captures important aspects of the data that a model
27 Indeed, if the principal believes that the agent will choose “Don’t Roll” with probability one then her “In”
choice is the unique Pareto efficient action, which entails zero kindness. As a result, the low-type agent has no
incentive to keep the promise.
28 Communication can be efficiency improving with more than two people if they have a common objective as
is the case, for instance, with jury decision making (Goeree and Yariv, 2011).
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with standard preferences cannot. However, none of the models by themselves can explain the
substitute patterns between competition and communication that we observe in the experiments.
Of course, this does not imply that the models are wrong – it is only natural to presume that
several factors are at work. It does imply, however, that more empirical work is needed to gauge
the relative importance of the proposed behavioral factors. Our study is only a first step and there
are many other directions worth exploring. One natural question to ask is whether communication
and competition act as substitutes in other environments. For example, will competition between
agents reverse the positive effect of communication in Charness and Dufwenberg (2006)’s one-
shot trust game with hidden action?29 Does an increase in the number of traders in a market
make communication more or less effective, and, vice versa, does the possibility of communication
reinforce or undermine the positive effects of an increase in competition?30 How are charitable
donations affected when multiple recipients can plead their cases to a donor?
Communication also plays an important role in group participation games such as voting.
For instance, depending on the degree of asymmetry in group sizes, does communication atten-
uate or exacerbate the “underdog” effect, i.e. the tendency of minority group members to par-
ticipate more frequently than majority-group members? Likewise, does communication reinforce
the “competition” effect that predicts increased participation rates when the degree of group-size
asymmetry becomes smaller? Finally, how does communication interact with the “size” effect,
which predicts that keeping fixed the relative group sizes, participation rates fall when groups
get bigger?31
Another avenue worth investigating is how the communication protocol affects its efficacy.
In this paper we considered only one-way communication from the agent(s) to the principal. It
would be interesting to explore whether two-way communication would undo or strengthen the
substitute effects of competition and communication.
29 Goeree and Zhang(2013) documents significant efficiency-enhancing effect of communication with or without
competition.
30 Preliminary evidence suggests that cheap-talk works well in bilateral bargaining but not in markets with a
larger number of traders (Goeree and Zhang, 2013).
31 Zhang (2013) reports that it is the larger group that benefits from within-group communication at the expense
of the smaller group in participation games.
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